It is rather we who are filled with sorrow because it is your fate to live on into the chaos that will follow.
Edit Historians writing without benefit of access to the French archives which were not opened until the mids such as William L. Shirer in his books The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and The Collapse of the Third Republic have claimed that France, although possessing at this time superior armed forces compared to Germany, including after a possible mobilization infantry divisions, was psychologically unprepared to use force against Germany.
Gamelin assumed a worst-case scenario in which a French move into the Rhineland would spark an all-out Franco-German war, a case which required full mobilization. At the same time, in late early France was gripped by a financial crisis, with the French Treasury informing the government that sufficient cash reserves to maintain the value of the franc as currently pegged by the gold standard in regard to the U.
Because France was on the verge of elections scheduled for the spring ofdevaluation of the franc, which was viewed as abhorrent by large sections of French public opinion, was rejected by the government of Albert Sarraut as politically unacceptable .
Investor fears of a war with Germany were not conducive to raising the necessary loans to stabilize the franc: Only by desperate arm-twisting from the major French financial institutions did Baumgartner manage to obtain enough in the way of short-term loans to prevent France from defaulting on her debts and keeping the value of the franc from sliding too far, in March .
Given the financial crisis, the French government feared that there were insufficient funds to cover the costs of mobilization, and that a full-blown war scare caused by mobilization would only exacerbate the financial crisis .
Upon hearing of the German move, the French government issued a statement strongly hinting that military action was a possible option . Baldwin asked Flandin what the French Government had in mind but Flandin said they had not yet decided.
Flandin went back to Paris and consulted the French Government what their response should be. They agreed that "France would place all her forces at the disposal of the League of Nations to oppose a violation of the Treaties". The strategy of Flandin was to strongly imply to the British that France was willing to go to war with Germany over the Rhineland issue, in the expectation that the British were not willing to see their Locarno commitments lead them into a war with the Germans over an issue where many in Britain felt that the Germans were in the right.
As such, Flandin expected London to apply pressure for "restraint" on Paris . As intended by Flandin, Eden was opposed to the French taking military action, and appealed for French "restraint" . Not aware of what Flandin was attempting to do, French military officials urged the government to tell Flandin to tone down his language .
Though disappointed with the British offers, which the French felt were too little, the French nonetheless considered the pledges of British support gained in to be a worthwhile achievement, especially given that for economic reasons mobilization was not considered a realistic option in .
Quote The generalissimo of the French Army, General Gamelintold the French government that if France countered the German forces and this caused a long war, France would be unable to win fighting alone and therefore would need British assistance. The French Government, with an upcoming general election in mind, decided against general mobilization of the French Army.
As long as the Rhineland was demilitarized, the French could easily re-occupy the area and threaten the economically important Ruhr industrial area which was liable to French invasion if France believed the situation in Germany ever became a threat. Policy of appeasement The reaction in Britain was mixed, but they did not generally regard the remilitarization as harmful.
Lord Lothian famously said it was no more than the Germans walking into their own backyard. George Bernard Shaw similarly claimed it was no different than if Britain had reoccupied Portsmouth. The Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin claimed, with tears in his eyes, that Britain lacked the resources to enforce her treaty guarantees and that public opinion would not stand for military force anyway .
The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Edendiscouraged military action by the French and was against any financial or economic sanctions against Germany. Eden instead wanted Germany to pull out all but a symbolic number of troops, the number they said they were going to put in the first place, and then renegotiate.
All of the Dominion High Commissioners in London, with South Africa and Canada being especially outspoken in this regard, made it quite clear that they would not go to war to restore the demilitarized status of the Rhineland, and that if Britain did so, she would be on her own .
Ever since the Chanak Crisis ofBritain had been keenly conscious that Dominion support could not be automatically assumed, and remembering the huge role the Dominions had played in the victory of could not consider fighting another major war without Dominion support.
Quote In response to objections like Simon, the British ended the staff talks with the French five days after they had begun; Anglo-French staff talks were not to occur again until February in the aftermath of the Dutch War Scare of January Taylor observed meant should France become involved in a war with Germany, there would be at a minimum a strong moral case because of the statement of March 19, for Britain to fight on the side of France .
For most of the inter-war period, the British were extremely reluctant to make security commitments in Eastern Europe, regarding the region as too unstable and likely to embroil Britain in unwanted wars.
France going to war with Germany in the event of a German attack on a member of the cordon sanitarie. Thus, in this way, the British statement of March offered not only a direct British commitment to defend France albeit phrased in exceedingly ambiguous languagebut also indirectly to the Eastern European states of the cordon sanitaire.
In this way, the British government found itself drawn into the Central European crisis of because of the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of meant any German-Czechoslovak war would automatically become a Franco-German war, and if the latter event occurred, the statement of March 19, would create strong pressure for British intervention.
It was because of this indirect security commitment via the proxy of France that the British involved themselves in the Central European crisis of despite the widespread feeling that the German-Czechoslovak dispute did not concern Britain directly .the reasons why adolf hitlers remilitarization of rhineland is a good strategic move top persuasive essay proofreading services online custom cover letter ghostwriting site for school una usa high school essay sample essays my family.
(Qui) Remilitarization of the Rhineland.
Cologne and Koblenz, Germany, March 18, Young and old hail them, with never a thought as to the possible result of Hitler's bold stroke. Joy everywhere. How easily the horrors of war are forgotten in the ecstasy of the moment. Koblenz-on-the-Rhine, once occupied by Uncle Sam's troops.
Now, Nazi. Apr 22, · The Rhineland was a good place to start, to show that Germany was regaining at least control of its own territory. 2 & 3. He annexed Austria, Austrians were glad about it. he wanted to create the 'grossen Deutschland' that Bismarck had been unwilling to achieve, hence reunite all the German speaking people into one schwenkreis.com: Resolved.
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just to say you gave a gift, Is Pass Plus a scam? The Reasons Why Adolf Hitler's Remilitarization of Rhineland is a Good Strategic Move PAGES 3. WORDS 1, View Full Essay. More essays like this: adolf hitler, remilitarization of rhineland, good strategic move.
Not sure what I'd do without @Kibin - Alfredo Alvarez, student @ Miami University. Exactly what I needed. German occupation of the Rhineland.
Adolf Hitler in his six wheeled Mercedes Benz Touring Car (HS 6/) View details in our catalogue. View lesson as PDF For this reason, a study of the Rhineland crisis is an excellent case study of British appeasement policy.